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vs, 





Case No. 14082 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action for a decree quieting title 
in their favor and against defendant, Ethel W. Blood, in certain 
real property near Hurricane, Utah, and for an order delcaring that 
defendant, Ethel W. Blood, has no interest in and to said real 
property pursuant to a certain uniform real estate contract, to 
which the plaintiffs were parties. 
• • , - . . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for the Fifth Judicial District in and 
for the County of Washington, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns presiding, 
entered its judgment declaring that Ethel W. Blood has no right, title 
or interest in the disputed property, that plaintiff, Dean Fullmer, 
is the sole owner in fee simple of the property, quieting title of 
Dean Fullmer as against defendant and the other plaintiffs, and 
ordering that all sums paid by defendant or her predecessors pur-
suant to the uniform real estate contract be forfeited as liqui-
dated damages, and denying the plaintiffs1 request for a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
the trial court, with the exception that this Court reverse that 
portion of the judgment rendered by the trial court denying plaintiff 
a reasonable attorney's fee, and that this Court award to the plain-
tiff as a reasonable attorney's fee the amount testified to in the 
trail court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
February 14, 1969, the plaintiff, Don K. Fullmer, and 
Mr. Keith W. Naylor purchased real property near Hurricane, Utah, 
from Winferd and Mona Spendlove on a uniform real estate contract. 
The purchase price of $47,817.00 was payable in ten equal annual 
installments after a down payment of $6,000.00 and $6,000.00 pay-
able May 16, 1969, together with interest on the principal at six 
percent (6%) per annum. On the date of purchase and until August 
29, 1970, the buyers were equal partners in a California partner-
ship doing business as Cal-Horizons Products and Imperial Products, 
On this latter date, Mr. Naylor and his wife purchased all of Don 
K. Fullmer and his wife's interest in the partnership. Note the 
Appellant's brief erroneously states that Mr. Naylor and his wife 
purchased all of Dean Fullmerfs and his wife's interest in the 
partnership, see R.161. 
Iff.!-* 
Mr. Naylor failed to pay Mr. Don K. Fullmer for the 
purchase of this partnership interest and on December 26, 1971, 
Mr. Don K. Fullmer and his wife obtained a judgment against the 
Naylors in California for the balance due from the sale of said 
partnership interest. They then sued on the California judgment in 
Washington County, Utah, and on April 28, 1972, obtained a Summary 
Judgment against the Naylors. The Fullmers, unaware that Mr. Naylor 
had assigned all of his interest in the uniform real estate contract 
in question to a Ethel W. Blood, purchased the Naylors interest in 
the subject property at a Sheriff's sale. 
Mrs. Blood's attorney then notified the Fullmers of 
the assignment which had taken place on September 22, 1970, after 
the purchase by Mr. Naylor of his partner's interest in aforesaid 
partnership and prior to Fullmers' judgment against Mr. Naylor. 
It should be emphasized that Mrs. Blood is the mother-in-law of Mr. 
Naylor. The plaintiff alleged in its Amended Complaint that Mr. 
Naylor was insolvent on the date of the alleged assignment. In 
any event, in consideration of the assignment of property for which 
the partnership had on that date paid the sum of $12,000, Mrs. 
Blood extinguished a $2,500 debt owed to her by Mr. Naylor and 
after execution of said assignment made the 1970 annual payment of 
$5,800 on the subject property. This was the only sum which Mrs. 
Blood paid on the subject property from that date to the present. 
March 9, 1974 Winferd and Mona A. Spendlove assigned 
their interest, as seller, in the uniform real estate contract in 
question to Dean Fullmer, brother of Don K. Fullmer. Annual pay- -
ments for the years 1971, 1972 and 1973 had not been made. On 
March 26, 1974, Dean Fullmer sent a certified demand letter to Mrs. 
Blood stating unless a buyer's deficiency in the amount of $5,367.35 
(the amount of the 1973 annual payment) was made within five days 
from the date of Mrs. Blood*s receipt of the letter all her interest 
would be forfeited and all of his obligations to her would be ter-
minated as provided in paragraph 16A of the uniform real estate 
contract. 
The defendant received this letter on April 1, 1974, not 
May 1, 1974, as set forth in appellant's brief (R.118). Twelve 
days later on April 12, 1974, Mrs. Blood, having failed to contract 
Dean Fullmer personally or through her attorney, was advised by 
letter that pursuant to paragraph 16A of the uniform real estate 
contract all sums paid by her had been forfeited. 
Since Mrs. Blood failed to respond to the written demands 
of Dean Fullmer on May 7, 1974, the plaintiffs moved to amend 
their complaint to add Mr. Dean Fullmer as a party plaintiff and 
to allege an additional cause of action against Mrs. Blood for 
failure to comply with the terms of the uniform real estate con-
tract. This motion was granted. 
* On June 5, 1974, Mrs. Blood's counsel personally handed 
plaintiffs' counsel a written tender dated June 4, 1974, of the 
amount demanded April 1, 1974, without funds enclosed (R. 162). 
The following day this tender was rejected on the grounds that it 
was made approximately 60 days after the defendant had been noti-
fied in writing that her interest had been forfeited and was 
therefore untimely. 
A copy of the trial court's order setting the matter for 
trial on September 5, 1974, was mailed to Defendant's counsel in 
St. George from Cedar City, Utah, on August 23, 1974. Appellant's 
brief is silent as to when defendant's counsel received the court's 
order, stating only that six days later on August 30 (Friday) a 
copy of the order was mailed to the defendant. Apparently, defense 
counsel's only other attempt to communicate with his client was a 
telephone call to her the day before the trial on September 4, 1974. 
Contrary to appellant's statement of fact, there is no 
evidence in the Supplemental Record of any witnesses testifying for 
the defense who were not and could not have been present on that 
date. Defendant's counsel moved for a continuance, if possible 
because his client was not present. The defendant's counsel then 
admits that the testimony of Mrs. Blood could be stipulated 
(S.R.G. 2). A recess of three hours then ensued during which 
time counsel discussed the stipulation of testimony in detail and 
the matter was recalled and proceeded as indicated in the Supple-
mental Record. The request of Defendant's counsel for a contin-
uance was never renewed. It can only be assumed that this is due 
to the fact that the testimony which counsel believed to be critical 
to her case was stipulated to in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
FORFEITING DEFENDANT BLOOD'S INTEREST IN THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
A. The Circumstances that Existed at the Time Plaintiffs 
gave Notice of Their Intention to Declare Forfeiture did not Excuse 
Defendant from Prompt Compliance with Plaintiffs1 Demands. 
The defendant now realizes that the stipulations as to the 
facts in this matter resulted in a judgment being rendered against 
the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant admits that a motion for 
relief from a stipulation is appropriately made to the trial court. 
In this case, no such motion was made. Having failed to do so, 
appellant asks the Supreme Court to in effect grant the appellant 
a new trial so that she may raise new issues and present evidence in 
support thereof. Finally, defendant does not deny the efficacy or 
conclusiveness of her stipulation but argues that the stipulation 
should be set aside because of the injustice to defendant arising 
from it. 
Appellant correctly states that all preconditions to the 
exercise of the options available to the seller upon the purchaser!s 
default under a uniform real estate contract must be strictly 
complied with. The respondent has complied with all the pre-
requisites to forfeiture as set forth in the Utah Supreme Court 
cases of LaMont v. Evjen, 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973) 
and Romero v. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P.2d 37 (1964). Applying 
these holdings to the instant case, on March 27, 1974, by certified 
letter, received by Ethel Blood on April 1, 1974, she was advised 
of her default in the annual payment due May 1973. She was further 
advised that she had five days to cure this default. Twelve days 
later, receiving no tender or other communication from Mrs. Blood, 
Dean Fullmer again advised Mrs. Blood in writing that a default had 
occurred. 
m 
Respondent knows of no Utah Supreme Court case holding 
the five day requirement in the standard uniform real estate con-
tract unreasonable. Nor, did defendant's counsel argue at any time 
prior to appeal that five days was unreasonable. In this case, the 
parties contractually agreed on the five day time period and further 
agreed that time was of the essence in their agreement. The facts 
of the case before the court are clearly distinguishable from 
Romero v. Schmidt, ibid, since in that case the seller was required 
to perform an affirmative act, i.e., provide an accounting of the 
balance due which he failed to do. Furthermore, in that case, 
the buyer made tender before the seller exercised his option to 
declare the whole debt due. In this case the tender was clearly 
made after the seller had exercised his option. 
The appellant attempts to create unreasonable behavior 
on the part of the plaintiff to preclude his resort to the remedies 
afforded him under the contract. This court must keep in mind that 
to construct this unreasonable behavior, the appellant quotes 
extensively from pleadings filed May 7, 1974, to the date of trial 
and argues from this as to the conduct and more importantly sub-
jective intent of the parties in March and April, 1974. 
The amended complaint was filed on June 14, 1974. The 
amended complaint was the first pleading filed that indicated that 
Don K. and Carma Fullmer had assigned their interest in the contract 
in question to Dean Fullmer on September 12, 1973. This document 
is unrecorded (R.39). Mrs. Blood never alleged knowledged of this 
assignment in March of 1974. The issue of co-tenancy arising out 
of this assignment was first argued by defendant's counsel in a 
I 
memorandum of points and authorities dated July 10, 1974, (R. 95). 
Respondent takes exception to the inference that prior 
to forfeiture of her interest Mrs. Blood knew of the assignment or 
understood that Dean Fullmer owned both a buyer's and a seller's 
interest. The record before this Court does not indicate that it 
was obvious to Mrs. Blood in March and April of 1974 that Dean 
Fullmer occupied both the seller's and buyer's interest under the 
contract. Dean Fullmer never advised or asserted to Mrs. Blood that 
he owned a buyer's interest in the uniform real estate contract in 
question, and never asserted the one-half buyer's interest in the 
property pursuant to the contract by virtue of the assignment. There 
is no evidence in the record to indicate that in March or April of 
1974 Mrs. Blood believed that Dean Fullmer had a buyer's interest in 
the property in question. There is no evidence that at the time of 
forfeiture Dean Fullmer did anything to confuse Mrs. Blood. There 
is no question that the court was concerned whether or not Dean 
Fullmer and Ethel Blood were co-tenants (R. 92), but this only became 
an issue after the pleadings were framed in the law suit. This 
occurred several months after the forfeiture of defendant's interest 
in the contract in question. 
In reviewing the evidence in preparation for trial after 
August 22, 1974, plaintiffs' counsel first became aware of the 
sale of the partnership assets to Mr. and Mrs. Naylor in the year 
1970. On the day prior to the trial, a conference was held between 
the respective counsel for the parties and after reviewing the 
evidence, defendant's counsel stipulated that the property in 
question was partnership property having been purchased with partner-
ih 
ship funds. A written copy of this stipulation was executed by 
counsel and presented to the court on the day of the trial, September 
5, 1975, (S.R.G. 2). For some unknown reason this stipulation does 
not appear in the record, but is set forth as Appendix A in appel-
lant's brief. The stipulation replaced superfluous facts which had 
preoccupied all parties and the trial court's attention after Mrs. 
Blood's interest had been forfeited. 
The conclusions reached by the trial court were based on 
the facts as they were admitted to by all parties. The appellant 
would request that the court disregard this stipulation and reverse 
the trial court's decision, based upon the circumstances under which 
the parties thought they were proceeding. The fallacy in this lies 
in the fact that there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
before the Supreme Court from which it might ascertain what the 
subjective belief and intent of the parties was between March 26, 
1974, and June 4, 1974. 
Respondent has strenuously argued from the date the 
issue was first raised by defendant's counsel that Dean Fullmer 
was not a co-tenant of Mrs. Blood. For the sake of argument, even 
assuming that the parties were co-tenants, the general rule of 
inurement set forth by the appellant in Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Utah 
2d 126, 349 P.2d 175 (1960) is inapplicable where the co-tenants' 
interests accrue at different times, by different instruments and 
by different persons where neither party has superior knowledge 
respecting the state of title and where neither party employs his 
co-tenancy to secure an advantage. 54 A.L.R. 886. The majority 
view holds that the general rule of inurement between co-tenants 
o 
is inapplicable where there is in fact no confidential relationship 
between cotenants. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, 
§70, p.168. " 
Here there was no evidence presented of a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties. A trustee relationship is not 
presumed simply because of the cotenancy relationship, see Hodgson 
v. Federal Oils1 Development Co., 54 A.L.R. 874 (1927). It is 
undisputed that Dean Fullmer and Ethel Blood acquired any cotenancy 
interest to which they may have visa each other from different 
grantors, by different instruments, at different times. 
B. The Evidence Fails to Show that the Parties Intended 
that the Land or Interest in the Contract was not Partnership 
Property. 
Defendant's counsel stipulated in writing that the 
property in question in this law suit was purchased out of partner-
ship funds. From this the trial court concluded that the property 
in question was partnership property (R. 161). Property which is 
paid for with partnership funds is prima facia the property of the 
partnership, although the title is taken in the individual name of 
one or more of the partners. Deming v. Moss, 40 Utah 501, 121 p.971, 
1912. 
Appellant accuses the trial court of overlooking the fact 
that the presumption is defeated by showing contrary intent. 
Appellant argues that the pleadings are repleat with evidence 
which rebut the presumption that property purchased with partner-
ship funds is partnership property. This argument ignores the 
fact that defendant's counsel, at trial, presented absolutely no 
evidence to the trier of fact of any contrary intention to rebut 
this presumption. The reason is clear, defendant's counsel had 
conceded that the property in question was partnership property. 
The fact that Dean Fullmer made statements which were 
inconsistant with this is easily explained by the fact that Mr. 
Fullmer was unaware of the purchase of his brother's interest by 
Mr. and Mrs. Naylor and of the consequences of this purchase. 
Furthermore, this evidence was not made available to plaintiffs' 
counsel until several days prior to the date of trial. 
As the Supreme Court is also aware, the pleadings which 
are extensively quoted by appellant are not evidence. Nevertheless, 
the issues raised by the stipulation and consent of the parties 
shall be treated as if they were raised in the pleadings and 
supplant and supersede the issues raised in the pleadings which 
they negate. Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the 
absence of any evidence presented to the trial court at the trial 
of the above matter to rebut the fact that property purchased 
with partnership funds is partnership property, the trial court 
correctly overlooked statements in the pleadings to the contrary. 
Appellant asks the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of the 
trial court so that he can present evidence on an issue which he 
failed to raise or present evidence on at the trial court level. 
In effect, appellant seeks reversal, not because or error by the 
trial court, but due to his own omission. The judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FORFEITING THE SUMS PAID 
BY DEFENDANT AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. '- " l i i 
Appellant erroneously states that $17,844.79 was forfeited 
by Mrs. Blood. Defendant's counsel stipulated that the defendant 
and her predecessor's interest had paid in total $12,156.00 on the 
contract in question (S.R.G. 5), not $17,844.79. Plaintiffs1 counsel 
accepted this verbal stipulation made at trial, even though the 
evidence indicated Mrs. Blood cancelled a $2,500.00 debt and paid 
one payment of $5,800.00 for a total investment in the property of 
$8,300.00. It should be pointed out to the Court that the stipulated 
figure did not include the $5,367.35 belatedly tendered by the 
defendant, since this amount of money was never accepted by the 
plaintiff. 
The appellant computes the forfeiture to be over 37% of 
the purchase price. This percentage is grossly overstated. It was 
computed by dividing $17,844.79 (alleged payments) by $47,817.00 
(alleged total contract price). Note that the $17,844.79 figure 
used by the appellant includes interest, while the $47,817.00 
figure does not. The contract bears interest at the rate of six 
percent (67o) per annum (R. 63) . The total interest computed on 
the unpaid balance over the life of the contract amounts to 
$11,819.00, and the total contract price is $59,636.00. 
Dividing the principal and interest actually paid by the 
defendant or her predecessor's interest, as stipulated, $12,156.00 
by the total principal and interest on the contract $59,636.00, the 
payments made by the defendant represent twenty percent 207o of the 
purchase price and not thirty-seven percent 37%. 
H ' •'•;f 
,.-n 
As a general rule !fthe law permits a person to make a 
contract which will result in the forfeiture; and when it is clear 
from the terms of the contract that the parties have so agreed, a 
court of law as well as a court of equity will enforce the for-
feiture,11 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §499 at 974. 
In Inglestrom v. Bushnell, 20 Utah 2d 250, 436 P.2d 806 
(1968), the Supreme Court affirmed the right of a seller under a 
uniform real estate contract to retain the down payment as a 
forfeiture for the buyer!s non-performance. In Jensen v. Neilsen 
26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673, 674, 675 (1971), the Court formulates 
a prerequisite for refusal to enforce a forfeiture. lf[T] the 
circumstances must be such that if the forfeiture were applied, it 
would be so grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view 
of the loss that might have been contemplated by the parties, that 
if it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would 
refuse to enforce such forfeiture.11 
The Court sites with approval Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 
2d 59, 278 P.2d 294, which states that the court will only . 
interfere with the parties contractual right to provide for 
a forfeiture, "when forfeiture would be so grossly excessive 
as to be entirely disproportionate to any possible loss...." 
These citations make it clear that the appellant has the 
burden of showing that the trial court erred in not finding the 
forfeitures so grossly excessive as to be entirely disproportionate 
to any possible loss. The burden of proof on this issue vested with 
defendant and the defendant presented no evidence whatsoever on this 
issue at trial. Defendant's counsel never argued to the trial court 
that the forfeiture of the amount stipulated as payment by the 
defendant was so grossly excessive as to be entirely dispropor-
i 
tionate to any possible loss. With no contrary evidence before 
trier of fact, he properly concluded that the twenty percent (20%) 
forfeiture in this case was not unconscionable. Evidence is the 
grist of the mill of justice, without it the court cannot act. 
Appellant seeks reversal so he may present evidence again that he 
omitted to present at trial. Nevertheless, this court has con-
sidered the fair rental value of the property during the period of 
occupancy as the primary factor to be considered in approximating 
the damage suffered by the seller. Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d, 263, 
300 P.2d 623 (1956). The defendant has had the right to possession 
of the 37 acres of farm property in question for approximately four 
years. Dividing the total payments made by the defendant of 
$12,156.00 by this time period amounts to an annual rental of 
$3,039.00 or approximately $82.00 per acre per year. This by itself 
is clearly not so grossly excessive as to be entirely disproportionate 
to any possible contemplated loss. 
Furthermore, in this case the plaintiffs made payments on 
the subject property in the years 1971 and 1972 to avoid a 
forfeiture by the original seller. They approximate the sum paid 
by the defendant and in affect the forfeiture reimburses him for 
these payments. When these factors are weighed against the 
$12,156.00 lost by the forfeiture, coupled with the fact that the 
defendants have presented no evidence that the forfeiture was 
unconscionable, nor prior to this appeal made any argument to that 
affect, the trial court's determination that the loss was not 
unconscionable should be upheld. 
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THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DISALLOWED PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
The instant action arose out of a breach of a uniform 
real estate contract by the defendant. This contract specifically 
provides that "should either party default in any of the covenants 
or agreements contained therein, the defaulting party shall pay 
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, 
which may arise or accrue from forcing the agreement, or in obtain-
ing possession of the premises covered thereby" (R. 64). This is 
the basis of plaintiffs' claim to attorney's fees. Hawkins v. Parry, 
123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372. 
The plaintiffs not only pled their entitlement to 
attorney's fees, but at the trial presented evidence as to the 
reasonableness of the $2,106.00 attorney's fee incurred (S.R.G.). 
Certainly the determination of whether the plaintiffs have met their 
burden on this issue is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, see, e.g., First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 
P.2d 563 (1974). 
The trial court found the defendant in total breach of 
her contract with the plaintiffs (R. 163). The contract between 
the parties provided that in such event the defendant shall pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee. The plaintiffs presented their evidence 
as to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees requested. There 
was no cross examination or rebutal testamony. Appellant admits 
that the factors involved in determing the amount of attorney's 
fees are favorable to plaintiffs. Appellant argues from this that 
because plaintiffs were successful, defendant should be relieved 
from her contractual obligation to pay plaintiffs1 attorney's fees, 
even though the acts of the defendant necessitated the attorney's 
fees incurred by plaintiffs. This argument defies logic and the 
absence of authority in appellant's brief in support of this 
proposition should be noted. 
The trial court did not direct any questions to the 
plaintiffs as to the necessity or reasonableness of the attorney's 
fee requested. The necessity of plaintiffs incurring attorney's 
fees is easily supported by a review of the Transcript of Record. 
Defendant raised numerous issues which required substantial research 
and lengthy memorandums by plaintiffs' counsel. Reviewing 
plaintiffs' testimony on the issue and in the absence of any 
contrary testimony at all, the trial court's refusal to allow 
attorney's fees can only be held to be arbitrary and an abuse of 
discretion. Furthermore, the trial court has failed to state in 
the record, or otherwise, the basis for its failure to award ? 
attorney's fees. This is emphasized by the purely speculative 
arguments raised by appellant as to why the court ruled as it did 
(appellant's brief, page 29). There is no basis in the record to 
determine why the trial court ruled as it did. This amounted to an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment below properly rests on the evidence pre-
sented to the trier of fact at the trial. The appellant seeks 
reversal on the grounds that circumstnaces existed which excuse 
appellant's prompt compliance. These "circumstances" were not 
presented as evidence to the trier of fact at the trial. There 
was no assertion that plaintiffs had both a buyerfs and seller's 
interest in the contract until after the forfeiture had occurred. 
There was absolutely no evidence at trial, nor is there in appellant's 
brief as to Mrs. Blood's perception of the circumstances at the time 
of forfeiture (March 26, 1974, to April 12, 1974). 
Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at trial to 
defeat the presumption that the property in question was partnership 
property. Pleadings simply are not evidence. Neither was there 
any evidence that the forfeiture of monies paid by Mrs. Blood was 
disproportionate to any contemplated loss. 
Appellant seeks reversal to present defenses and evidence 
which were omitted by counsel at the trial. Appellant's position 
is that the trial court committed error by not considering the 
pleadings as evidence and not ruling in appellant's favor on issues 
which may have been raised in the pleadings but on which appellant 
failed to present evidence at trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should affirm the decision of trial court, except as to failure to 
award plaintiffs their attorney's fees which should be reversed, 
awarding respondent $2,106.00. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ALLEN, THOMPSON, HUGHES & BEHLE 
zoJfltie-
FRANK A. ALLEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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